In this week’s readings, we see that the democratic ideal of the knowledge commons grows complicated as open access publishing platforms are increasingly targeted by information capitalism. Lamdan, Kember & Brand, and Aspesi et al. all highlight the relationship between open access scholarship and data analytics: as academic publishing proves less and less profitable, companies that once distributed research are now finding financial success in privatizing and paywalling  information that was created under public funding; mining data from their users; and interpreting user data to generate predictions about academic futures, lucrative research investments, and even public engagement with government systems. Kember & Brand offer an optimistic solution to the “corporate capture of open access publishing” by advocating for cross-institutional collaboration and non-profit, non-commercial publishing platforms. However, Lamdan’s book reveals the overwhelming ubiquity of the “data cartels” that undergird the world of information media, essentially making any separation between knowledge and capital impossible. Lamdan identifies two companies — Thomson Reuters and RELX — as the leading data analytics conglomerates behind the push to privatize information at the expense of public cost, safety, and freedom. Within the RELX group, Aspesi et al. focus part of their article on the academic publisher Elsevier, which exemplifies the ability of private publishing companies to control knowledge production through their insider-trading-like access to industry professionals, funding decisions, and university hiring practices. 

After reading the preface and opening chapter of Lamdan’s Data Cartels: The Companies that Control and Monopolize our Information, I was horrified by the power of companies like Thomson Reuters and RELX to transform our data into profit; and disturbed by the links between personal information and systemic violence enacted through surveillance. I wanted to know how these infamous data cartels presented themselves, and visited the Thomson Reuters website. On a recent job posting for “Associate Client Executive, FindLaw”, the company confidently states: “We have a superpower that we’ve never talked about with as much pride as we should – we are one of the only companies on the planet that helps its customers pursue justice, truth and transparency. Together, with the professionals and institutions we serve, we help uphold the rule of law, turn the wheels of commerce, catch bad actors, report the facts, and provide trusted, unbiased information to people all over the world.” This characterization of Thomson Reuters’s work counters some of Lamdan’s most revelatory explanations of the company’s use of data: there is no mention of ICE, “double dipping” information, inaccurate criminal and arrest records, or prescriptive insurance policies. From Lamdan’s book, I got the impression that companies like Thomson Reuters actively do not want their customers to pursue justice, truth, and transparency — unless the company itself is the one dictating what is just, true, and transparent. Contained within Thomson Reuters’s hubristic self-assessment, I did find a kernel of truth: through their overwhelming, inextricable social and political influence, data cartels do have the power to “uphold the rule of law”, “turn the wheels of commerce”, and “provide […] information to people all over the world”. And what a terrifying thought that is… 

Question 1: In their piece on “The Corporate Capture of Open-Access Publishing”, Sarah Kember and Amy Brand propose a safeguard to the future of public knowledge: “More international collaboration, including linked university repositories and, potentially, state-owned, noncommercial platforms, is also needed to turn the false promise of “openness” into truly public knowledge.” Do you think that cross-institution collaboration can be successful, even as academic institutions compete for funding and research breakthroughs? What should the role of the state be in creating and circulating public knowledge?

Question 2: Sarah Lamdan points out that old regulatory laws are not equipped to limit the monopoly that data cartels have on the public’s access to information  (Lamdan, 22). Similarly, are information piracy and theft laws commensurate to the act of releasing paywalled or privatized information to the public? What have cases like United States v. Swartz taught us about making public information accessible through illegal channels?

Question 3: The SPARC Landscape Analysis report ends with suggestions for mitigating the risks inherent to the movement of commercial publishers into the heart of academic institutions. “Risk mitigation” would take the form of “actions aimed at protecting colleges and universities from the unintended consequences of deploying a rising number of data analytic tools and collecting larger and more intrusive amounts and categories of data.” Recalling our discussions on infrastructure, how do you imagine a “risk mitigation infrastructure” could look at CUNY? How would checks and balances be implemented to protect the CUNY community’s personal data and intellectual property? Which existing university offices would be tasked with handling the data analytics companies; or what roles would need to be created to do so?

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